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Dissolving Yablo’s Hostage Crisis: In Defence of Deﬁance
Suki Finn
University of Southampton
ABSTRACT
Yablo suggests a ‘hostage crisis’ occurs when an unproblematic statement ’ entails,
and is therefore hostage to, a problematic statement c. Yablo proposes a technical
solution to this kind of problem by diminishing ’ to ’, where ’ does not entail c
and thus is not hostage to it. I argue that Yablo’s proposal is unnecessary because the
original, undiminished ’ does not in fact entail c. This is what Yablo calls a ‘deﬁant’
position. I defend deﬁance by arguing that ’ and c are of different metaphysical
weights, which I show through an analysis of their use of quantiﬁcation.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 27 August 2016; Revised 23 December 2016
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Yablo presents four options for dealing with the hostage crisis: (1) deﬁance; (2) scepti-
cism; (3) boosterism; and (4) if-thenism. Yablo fails to seriously consider the deﬁant
position, which I take to be a mistake. I aim to show that it is a good, even preferable,
option to the others, and the crisis that Yablo cites provides evidence in favour of such
a position. The sceptic and booster accept that ’ entails c, balancing their conﬁdence
in ’ and c accordingly. The sceptic responds to the crisis by becoming sceptical about
’ (since it entails c which they are sceptical about), whereas the booster responds by
becoming conﬁdent in c (since it is entailed by ’ which they are conﬁdent in). Such a
balancing act resolves the hostage crisis by preventing the surprising result of inferring
a problematic c from an unproblematic ’, by taking ’ and c to be as equally problem-
atic or unproblematic as each other. It thus would not matter if ’ is hostage to c since
our conﬁdence levels in ’ and c would be equal. Thomasson [2017] interprets Yablo’s
if-thenism as an extension of the sceptical response, as in light of becoming sceptical
about ’ (due to it entailing c which they are sceptical about), the if-thenist takes it that
one was actually originally conﬁdent in a diminished ’ (which does not entail c). ’
is then freed from c and is thus no longer hostage to it, resolving the supposed hostage
crisis.
Yablo goes to great efforts to calculate ’ as ’ » c, which is understood as the
remainder of ’ when c is taken away from ’, in order to identify a content ’ that
might be heard as what ’ expresses, but which does not entail c. Yet, according to the
deﬁantist, such efforts are unnecessary. The deﬁantist holds that ’ is actually more
probable than c, and thus ’ itself would not entail c. So if one wants to free the hos-
tage ’ and prevent the entailment to c, one needn’t diminish ’ to ’ via the if-thenist
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route, as one can simply deny that ’ is hostage to c via the deﬁant route. The deﬁant
approach dissolves the hostage crisis by showing that there is no entailment from an
unproblematic ’ to a problematic c, and here I will outline why the entailment does
not hold. I will argue that it is due to an imbalance not just in the conﬁdence we have
in ’ and c but in the metaphysical weight of ’ and c, which I will show through distin-
guishing quantiﬁcational commitment from ontological commitment.
1. Ontological Hostage Crises
In all of Yablo’s examples below we have an unproblematic truth ’ apparently entailing
an ontological claim c, showing the hostage crises to be ontological:
’: The number of even primes is 1.
c: Numbers exist.
’: I am thinking.
c: There are thinking substances.
’: This is a hand.
c: There are material objects.
’: There are eight pawns on each side [of a chess game].
c: Pawns exist.
What appears to cause the crises is the assumption that the truth of ’ commits one to
the existence of the things spoken of in ’, entailing an ontological claim c. It is the
assumed ontological requirements that need to be met for ’ to be true that causes ’ to
be hostage to c. I therefore take the hostage crises to reside in the debate over whether
one can talk truthfully about nonexistent things, and thus whether one can quantify
without existence. Yablo seems to presuppose an answer to this debate by taking the
truth of the quantiﬁcational ’ to entail the ontological c. To demonstrate, rewrite his
ﬁrst example as such:
’: Some numbers are prime.
c: Numbers exist.
The crisis here concerns an unproblematic quantiﬁed claim ’ about some numbers
being a certain way, as being hostage to, and entailing, an ontological claim c about
numbers existing in general. But it is controversial to assume that one can generally
deduce existence from true quantiﬁcational claims. To infer c from ’, one must take
quantiﬁcation to be ontologically committing, which Meinongians and some free logi-
cians, who I call neutralists, do not hold. Neutralists hold an ontologically neutral read-
ing of quantiﬁcation and thus can accept that certain statements are true without
requiring that the things they speak of exist. Hence, these hostage crises occur only for
those who endorse a certain view of the relationship between truth, quantiﬁcation and
existence, and are completely avoided by neutralists. Furthermore, the inferences from
’ to c that Yablo discusses are evidence that quantiﬁcation is best interpreted in a neu-
tralist way, rather than in the ontologically loaded way that Yablo presupposes which
leads to the hostage crises. I therefore offer a prescriptive proposal to dissolve the hos-
tage crises in a deﬁant way as well as a descriptive account of why such crises support
my proposal to interpret quantiﬁcation in an ontologically neutral way. Yablo
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overlooks the neutralists, which I argue he is not entitled to do, given that they hold
respectable positions in on-going debates in the history of philosophy, positions that I
brieﬂy summarise below.
2. The Neutralists
2.1 Meinongians
Meinongians, at a minimum, believe that there are nonexistent things, and that we can
truly speak of such things by referring to those nonexistent things. Therefore, they
would hold that ’ can be true whilst c is false, as it may be true that some numbers are
prime even though numbers do not exist, and we can truly say ‘3 is a prime number’
whilst referring to the nonexistent object ‘3’. Meinongians argue that properties can be
truly attributed to nonexistent things, and as such being a prime can be truly attributed
to numbers even if they are nonexistent things. The ability to refer to nonexistent things
is explained by domains of quantiﬁcation containing both existent and nonexistent
members, and so the quantiﬁers are treated as ontologically neutral in order to quantify
over both. Successfully referring to an object in the domain will not entail the existence
of that object, and truthfully describing a thing to be a certain way will not entail the
existence of that object. When one speaks of a thing as in ’, they may refer to an exis-
tent or a nonexistent thing, and as such ’ will not entail c which explicitly claims that
the thing spoken of is existent. (For examples of Meinongian arguments see Parsons
[1982] and Routley [1982].)
2.2 Free Logicians
One feature of some systems of free logic is that they allow for successful reference
without referents, such that one could make a true statement without referring to any-
thing whatsoever (not even to a nonexistent thing). Therefore, one can talk truthfully
without there being a referent to talk about. This is because such free logicians allow
for quantiﬁcation over an empty domain, and so a member of a domain to serve as a
referent is not always required. Hence, quantiﬁcation will be ontologically neutral since
to quantify over a domain will not necessitate the existence of members, as there may
be no members at all to quantify over. As such, statements like ’ can be true whilst a
corresponding statement like c is false, because ’ can talk truthfully about a thing
without any referent at all, let alone a referent to an existent thing as c demands. (See
Sainsbury [2005] for a discussion of reference without referents in free logic.)
3. Metaphysical Weight
There is an important difference between ’ and c which will illuminate why I take it
that ’ does not entail c. I take such differences at face value and treat them as evidence
against the legitimacy of the hostage crises. The differences that Yablo cites (and then
goes on to defuse) between ’ and c are as such:
’ is unproblematic and probable, which we are initially conﬁdent in.
c is problematic and improbable, which we are initially sceptical towards.
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I propose to think in terms of the metaphysical weight of ’ and c, which will explain
the differences above rather than defusing them. By the phrase ‘metaphysical weight’, I
mean how ontologically laden the statement is, for example Hofweber [2007] speaks of
‘innocent statements’ and their ‘metaphysically loaded counterparts’, where statements
like ’ look to be innocent (or lightweight), and statements like c look to be metaphysi-
cally loaded (or heavyweight). Given this imbalance in weight between our two propo-
sitions, we may question how it is that ’ can entail c, when ’ is a lightweight
statement entailing the heavier c. This is just a re-description of Yablo’s hostage crises,
where he writes that the problem arises when ‘the logically stronger claim [’] seems
likelier than its weaker counterpart [c]’ [Yablo 2017: 118].
Rather than accepting this difference, Yablo presents lines of response that try to
resolve it, in order to understand how ’ can entail c by balancing out their probabili-
ties and our levels of conﬁdence in them. So parallel to the booster and sceptical
responses, one can balance the weighting issue by arguing that: (i) c is not as heavy-
weight as we initially thought, actually c is just as innocent as ’ (and as such we should
boost our conﬁdence in c in seeing it to be just as probable as ’); or (ii) ’ is more
heavyweight than we initially thought, actually ’ is equally as ontologically loaded as c
(and as such we should become more sceptical about ’ in seeing it to be as improbable
as c). Instead of defusing the differences and balancing ’ with c, I deﬁantly argue that
we accept the differences and use the imbalance as evidence that ’ does not entail c,
which in turn is evidence for neutralism – that quantiﬁcation does not entail existence.
4. Quantiﬁcational and Ontological Commitments
The reason that ’ is lightweight and c is heavyweight is because ’ is merely a quantiﬁ-
cational claim and c an ontological claim. And I, like neutralists, argue that one cannot
deduce ontology from quantiﬁers. As such ’ does not entail c because quantiﬁcational
commitment should not be conﬂated with ontological commitment. Once one has dis-
tinguished between these types of commitment the crisis is dissolved, as ’ is no longer
hostage to c when ’ delivers merely lightweight quantiﬁcational commitments and c
instead delivers heavyweight ontological commitments. To see this, let us return to our
example:
’: Some numbers are primes.
c: Numbers exist.
It is common for ’ to be rewritten as ‘There exists some numbers that are prime’, which
clearly entails the existence of numbers (c). But it is unnecessary (and I take it to be
incorrect) to interpret the quantiﬁcational ‘some’ as equivalent to the ontological ‘there
exists’. The difference between ‘some’ and ‘there exists’ is that ‘some’ is an ontologically
neutral quantiﬁcational term, and ‘there exists’ is not a quantiﬁcational term at all.
‘Some’ is about the number of things (namely at least one of them), and so is quantita-
tive, whereas ‘there exists’ describes those things as existent, and so is qualitative.
Therefore the word ‘some’ is ﬁt for numerical quantiﬁcational use, and ‘there exists’ is
not, as existence may be better understood as a predicate. The commitments that one
gains from ‘some’ will be lightweight and quantiﬁcational, and alternatively the com-
mitments that one gains from ‘exists’ will be heavyweight and ontological. (For a more
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detailed exposition of why these types of commitments should not be conﬂated, see
Berto [2012], Azzouni [2004], and Priest [2008], for example.)
A deﬁantist accepts this difference to dissolve the crisis, whereas the booster and
sceptic aim to balance the weight to make sense of the entailment between ’ and c.
The booster will decrease the weight of c in order to boost their conﬁdence in it, mak-
ing ’ and c both lightweight and merely quantiﬁcational. The sceptic will increase the
weight of ’ in order to become more sceptical of it, making ’ and c both heavyweight
and ontological. Indeed it is the sceptic who is guilty of rewriting ’ as the heavyweight
‘There exists some numbers that are primes’, and as a result Yablo searches for a dimin-
ished lightweight ’ that does not entail c. But the search for the identity of ’ starts
and ends with ’, as ’ is already sufﬁciently diminished and lightweight to not entail c
once we hold with the neutralists that ’ is quantiﬁcational and c is ontological.
5. The Deﬁant Conclusion
In conclusion, if one, like Yablo, ﬁnds the hostage crisis legitimate, then one, like Yablo,
is moved to ﬁnding a way to free the innocent hostage ’ from its metaphysically loaded
counterpart c. Yet such efforts are in vain when one can just dissolve the crisis, for
example, by taking a deﬁant position in denying that ’ was ever hostage to c in the ﬁrst
place due to the neutralist reading of quantiﬁcation in ’ and c. According to the neu-
tralists, if ’ never alone implied c, then there is no crisis for which the identiﬁcation of
a diminished ’ is needed. The deﬁant claim that ’ is more probable than c is sup-
ported by the neutralists, and we must take such positions seriously, as they are inde-
pendently motivated, and may require fewer interpretive assumptions about how
listeners hear the content of ’ without the need to contort it as ’.1
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